Russia's great offensive begins. Zhdanov's analysis of the 54th day of the war
Russian troops finished the preparation for a larger offensive. The main mass of the offensive grouping has already been located in Ukraine for an attack in the direction of Izyum-Gulyai Polye. And about 20-25 thousand soldiers remain on the territory of Russia, continuing to restore their combat capability and manning with personnel and combat equipment. The supply of materials, ammunition and fuel is being completed.
We see the group readiness for a major offensive in the next few days.
Part of the reserves are still not ready. But probably they won't wait for the rains to stop, because they are pressed by the deadlines. May is coming and with it - the sacred date May 9th. The day by which Putin demands that the main tasks of the so-called Special Military Operation should be completed.
Now active task are in progress on all fronts, in the form of "combat intelligence" - for finding the most vulterable areas in our defence and further focus their efforts there.
At this stage there are no other possibilities than the attack of the enemy in the Donbas region.
In the South, in the Herson direction, we control the situation and the combat actions. Without advancing in a broad front, we seek to press the group that managed to take a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dneper river.
A possible naval and airborne operation on the Nikolaev's direction will be complicated as a result of the doom of the cruiser Moskva. It provided the main shield of the air defence of the Black Sea Fleet's squadron of surface ships. Now we have a much broader capability to use aviation against these forces.
Furtermore, the main part of the grouping of the ground forces is concentrated precisely in the Eastern direction in Donbas.
The main plan is our grouping to be encircling in the area of the operation of the United forces (which also covered the direction against the so-called National Republics in Eastern Ukraine before the war).
There is a definition which reads "the war machine is already set in motion". The flywheel has been started, any attempt to change the direction can only "destroy" it. This would involve a huge effort in redeploying troops. A possible change in the direction of the main strike changes everything: the routes for withdrawal; the operational areas for deployment, the whole logistics.
A change in the direction of the main strike practically means a change of the whole plan of the operation.
For the Ukrainian armed forces this concept is possible. We are not at such stage "burdened" with heavy weaponry. We have a manoeuvre defence.
For them everything is like during the Second World War. Heavy columns of armored vehicles mapped with "one- and two-sided ranges and deep encirclement operations" pursue victory over the enemy.
That's why an possible change of the direction of the main attack is not just putting new "arrows" on the map, but a heavy and overwhelming work of the entire military machine. And the loss of at least two more weeks, during which they will be busy with only one thing: regrouping. And being under our fire.
Combats in Mariupol continue
We continue to hold about one-third of the whole area of the region, mainly the industrial one. According to some reports, there has been a partial weakening of the enemy's pressure, as they have been forced to remove some of their active forces and transfer them to Donbas.
The enemy does not have a whole control of the region. The fact that they are creating a picture for the TV screens, that they are walking through the streets, that there is a commandant's office, it's only for the part of the city they control.
Part of our forces from the marines (navy) succeded in transferring from their defence region to the defence region of the Azov Regiment. If before we could held two defensive support areas, now we are defending one. And the Azov group is reinforced - that means the organization of our defense is more dense. So we have better opportunities to organize duty shifts. This is especially important for the dark part of the day. The main combat is on the territory of the Azovstal factory.
Sadly there are no future possibilities for deblocking of Mariupol. Now we don't have posibilities to transfer weapons and evacuate the casuelties with helicopters.
The shortest distance from the defending positions to our troops is about 90 kilometers.
If we withstand in the Donbas region, there could be a situation in which the south grouping of the enemy might start falling apart. Then, when we deploy from Gulyai Polie, we can make a corridor to Mariupol.
The combat in the region of Donbas could continue as long as 2 weeks
This is because the operational reserve of the Russian forces of 20-25 thousand people is not ready yet. They will try to introduce it as a second echelon. But this is unlikely to solve the problem with the scope of the operation.
The size of their grouping, which was triggered in the first wave of the invasion, was about 150,000 to 180,000 men in four strategic directions. And we succeeded, with the full-time, peacetime composition of the army (until February 24 we neither mobilized nor deployed additional forces) in neutralizing this offensive.
With the destruction of the "Moskva" cruiser, "the dark cloud" upon our heads went by
With its ship's C 300 "Reef" anti-aircraft missile set, the cruiser covered - in anti-aircraft terms - a huge area on land too, which abutted the approaches to Herson. So, today the density of the enemy's air defense is significantly lower, and this will increase our firepower.
If we consider only Putin's "folly" and the complicating situation for Russian troops in which he is losing control options, the possibility of his desperate decision to use weapons of mass destruction should not be overlooked.
But the question is: will Putin be allowed to do this? There are a lot of investigative signs that the Kremlin's "towers" are seriously shaken. And there has begun an open struggle for the "throne". And no one is paying much attention to the question "is Putin still on the throne".
Most Russian propagandian broadcast shows have already asked questions such as: why do we need a second Afghanistan; the army have already completed its tasks; and the denazification is only a problem for the Ukrainians, so let them solve it. And there is no counter action.
As we know, these broadcasts are controlled by the federal security service under the leadership of chief ideologue Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council. He heads the entire "permission" system of the Russian propaganda machine.
Patrushev himself now has a full "carte blanche" on Russia's governance on behalf of Putin. Even Putin may not be aware of such "forays" in propaganda.
Such facts suggest that even if Putin "shouts" from the "bunker" - "Here are your launch codes, launch the missile!", it is unlikely that such an order will be carried out. But this does not completely rule out the possibility that he will "psyche out" for good and order such a "mega crime."
The use of tactic nuclear weapon on the groupings of the Ukrainian forces will not have any practical value and it won't change the situation on ground.
For a nuclear strike with a tactical nuclear munition, the enemy must first withdraw its own forces from the area to a safe distance. If, for example, the least powerful munition of 0.4 kilotons is used, for a 152 mm artillery shell, its strike radius is 15 kilometres. Own troops must be driven back to a distance of 25-30 kilometres. And after the strike, they must be ready in a "single armoured battle line", with anti-nuclear protection on the fighting vehicles and tanks, at maximum speed, to "rush" through the area, the epicentre of the nuclear blast. Thus says the tactics for conducting combat operations using tactical nuclear weapons.
In the event that they begin a retreat in preparation for a nuclear strike, we will seek to move in immediately, keeping as short a distance as possible. Our intelligence and that of our allies is also constantly working.
The possible use of even more powerful nuclear ammunition is even a greater folly. Who can influence "the rose of the winds". Putin can not order someone to blow to the clouds and direct where the radioactive cloud will fly after the blast.
The only option that is more realistic is a strike on a NATO site "out there far away".
But it should be taken into account what the UK said yesterday that even in the event of the use chemical weapons, not nuclear weapons, it reserves the right, unilaterally, without consulting the other NATO member states, to strike back. Together with its 'partners', which are primarily the US, Canada, as well as Turkey and Poland.
So Russia is already forewarned about chemical weapons and it has to draw its own conclusions about how this applies to nuclear weapons. And this is especially important not so much for Putin himself, but for those in his entourage who actually run the country today. And who are hoping for a "miracle" to find themselves at the negotiating table with the West. And to start negotiating Russia's relations with the West on a clear page.
However, this implies a "disregard" of Putin's will. To our knowledge, sober voices are being heard at Russia'a army headquarters. They suggest that Putin quits the second phase ot the war in Ukraine. To save the remaining combat forces "for any eventuality".
What will happen if the Talibans start a offensive against Tadjikistan and devision 201, originaly deployed in Tadjikistan. Today it is in the Donbas region. And yesterday it felt under our active fire.
And if an withdrawl from Ukraine is necessary, who will cover the withdrawing of the troops. Or will it happen as in 1812, at the Berezina River, in present-day Belarus, when only the carriage with Napoleon and a small "detachment" of his personal guards managed to escape to Paris.
All in all, what we see today in Russia is a significant activisation of the Federal Security Service and the rise of its role.
At the moment an investigation of arrested high-ranking officers in underway to clarify the data on the "huge" losses in the First Army Corps of the so-called Donetsk NAtional Republic. When ordered at the beginning of the war, the staff was 100% manned, but it turned out that it was only 50% manned, but the funds for the maintenance and training of the fictitious staff were "fully utilized". The investigation is being conducted by the FSF.
Interrogations are conducted at the General Headquarters - now commanders are questioned. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet did not lead the ceremony honoring the surviving crew of the Moskva cruiser, but was represented by his deputy because the commander had been arrested.
At all levels in the military office there are repressions. And that's why the system of the military governance and leadership is hightly at risk.
The Federal security service tried to put the whole responsibilyty on the military. Leveling his blame for the most critical mistake made by the FSF's Fifth Department with the source data they submitted for the planning of the "Special Military Operation."
It should also be taken into account that Patrushev is "pro-Western". He is unlikely to play out a confrontation with the US and the EU. This makes him much more preferable than a possible representative of the military top in the search for an alternative to Putin.
And this will inevitably have an impact on the morale of the troops and especially the command staff who find themselves being fooled, used and in all likelihood sacrificed.
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